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Comparativism and Federalism
Kirk W. Junker'
In addition to comparing the various formulae for federalism
that the participating states practice, the participants in this
Seminar explored insights into the nature of federalism itself.
John D. Richard, Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Canada, framed the Seminar by asking how one might understand
"federalism." Is it, for instance, a power tension between the na-
tional and local? Or is it a subset of the tension between cultural
homogeneity, cultural nationalism, or globalization on the one
hand, and the resistance or subversion by smaller groups on the
other hand? And as commentary to the answer to all of these
questions, he noted the growing irrelevance of the nation-state in
the shadow of non-governmental organizations and supra-national
organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the Euro-
pean Union.
It is also, of course possible to consider federalism in comple-
mentary and voluntary modes, rather than those in tension. In
the remarks with which he opened the Seminar, John P. Flaherty,
Chief Justice Emeritus of Pennsylvania, reminded us that William
Penn voluntarily relinquished the personal power that the British
monarch had granted to him through the land that took his name
and became a state. This theme of personal choices and their in-
fluence on democracy remained a theme throughout the Seminar.
In his comments to Judge Brooks Smith's presentation, Professor
Ken Gormley said that to his mind, the real reason that United
States' federalism works is the voluntary relinquishing of power
by all three federal branches of government. And midway through
the Seminar, Professor Bruce Ledewitz, in commenting upon the
courageous work of Dr. Allan R. Brewer-Carfas in the government
of Venezuela, emphasized that it is people, not structures, who
make democracy.
In these considerations of federalism the audience heard not
only from a mixture of countries, but from a mixture of persons:
1. Assistant Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Duquesne Uni-
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judges, legislators, ministers, trial lawyers, and academics. This
mixture of countries and legal roles within these countries inher-
ently lends itself to making comparisons - comparisons regarding
the various forms of federalism constructed and maintained by the
various federal states represented at the Seminar, but also com-
parisons between and among various roles of legal actors within
those federal states.
During the Seminar, Professor Alejandro M. Garro was the first
person to make explicit the inherent comparativist nature of this
gathering. I am happy to have been asked to comment specifically
on the contribution by Peter J. Tettinger, who is both a state con-
stitutional court judge for the state of Northrhine-Westphalia in
Germany and a Professor of Law at the University of Cologne.
But given the insightful comments already made by Professor
Ronald A. Brand and Dr. Louis G. Ferrand regarding Professor
Tettinger's paper, it would seem more purposeful and less redun-
dant in my contribution to say a few things in conclusion of the
Seminar, and consequently return to some ideas about compara-
tivism itself.
A. Is LAw A SCIENCE?
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the famous Dean of Harvard
Law School who introduced the "case method" to the study of law
in the United States, announced in 1886 that "[LIaw is a science"
and "that law books were to us all what laboratories of the univer-
sity are to the chemists and physicists. . .. " In the Duquesne
Seminar, it would be perhaps illustrative of Langdell's assertion
that law is indeed a science to note that the remarks that Profes-
sor Brand has prepared in response to Professor Tettinger's paper
turn out in large measure to assess the same topics that I had
prepared to discuss in response to Professor Tettinger's paper,
without either of us having consulted the other beforehand. More
broadly, if indeed law is a science, a question for us becomes
whether we can contribute to the science through comparative
legal study. And if we can, to what end? Non-lawyers, beginning
2. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD (Cambridge, 1967), 175, quoted in
DANIEL COQUILLETrE, THE ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 559 (Carolina Academic
Press 1999). See also Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline:




students, and cocktail party interlocutors often approach com-
parative study as though it is intended to deliver to us the answer
to the question of which legal system is better. Given that legal
systems serve different cultures with different norms, values, and
expectations of their respective legal systems, it would seem to be
an unanswerable question.
In their gold-standard treatise on comparative law, Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kotz, Director of the Max Planck Institute in
Hamburg, have written that "[iut is beyond dispute today that the
scholarly pursuit of comparative law has several significant func-
tions. This emerges from a very simple consideration, that no
study deserves the name of science if it limits itself to phenomena
arising within its national boundaries.' They go on to list par-
ticular practical benefits of comparative law that call for close at-
tention. First, comparative law is an aid to legal reform in devel-
oping countries, as Dr. Jos6 Gamas-Torruco reported during this
Seminar. Second, in the development of one's own domestic legal
system, comparative law engenders a necessary critical attitude,
more than local doctrinal disputes can. Third, comparative law is
an aid to the legislator. Fourth, comparative law is a tool of con-
struction. And fifth, comparative law enriches the curriculum of
the universities.4
To this fifth point I might add three points of my own. First, we
may want to recall the historical fact that the common law itself
was born when Duke William of Normandy defeated Harald near
Hastings in England in the year 1066. After his victory, William
sent out his own men to observe and record the practices of the
local sheriffs in the various shires of his new territory. Borrowing
perhaps from the ancient practice of consulting the jus gentium
when thejus civilis provided no answer in Rome, William distilled
the solutions that were common among the sheriffs, and from
those solutions he invented a body of law common to all the shires
of the territory.
3. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (Tony
Weir, trans., Oxford: Claredon Press, 3d ed. 1998).
4. Id. at 16. Here it should perhaps be noted that although the excellent English lan-
guage translation of Zweigert and Kotz translates "Wissenschaft" into "science" in English,
the German notion of "Wissenschaft" is both in usage and denotation broader than the
native English use of "science." German uses "Wissenschaft" more in the way that Ro-
mance languages use variants on the Latin "scientia," that is, to mean "having knowledge."
Thus, for example, it might not be quite the point of contention to call the study of litera-




My second point is that even within standard common law study
in the United States, the case method means the production and
study of knowledge that takes cases from a variety of state and
federal jurisdictions at all levels, and regularly mixes them to-
gether in training law students not to memorize particular rules
for particular local courts, but rather to learn both the geographic
breadth and historic depth of possibility in the resolution of social
disputes before the law.
My third point regards not domestic law and federalism, but
domestic law as a source of international law. The famous Article
38 of the Statute of the Court of International Justice, establish-
ing the Court's jurisdiction, provides that there are three primary
sources of law. One of these three sources is custom. Custom, as a
term of art, requires that one determine what the comparative
domestic legal practices of a sufficient number of states are. And
this leads us back to the words of Hein Kotz. As Kotz says:
If one accepts that legal science includes not only the
techniques of interpreting the texts, principles, rules and
standards of a national system, but also the discovery of
models for preventing or resolving social conflicts, then it
is clear that the method of comparative law can provide a
much richer range of model solutions than a legal science
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different
systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solu-
tions than could be thought up in a lifetime by even the
most imaginative jurist who is corralled in his own sys-
tem.5
And so we see that the study of comparative law is not just a
decorative exercise for traveling academics, but instead goes to
fundamental questions of knowledge production, of the nature of
law, and of human behavior. Furthermore, it is worth remember-
ing that some of what we can expect to learn through comparison
cannot be anticipated - that is, known in advance, not even by
framework, because that would act as providing prejudice - a
particularly important word for jurists to use carefully. Thus, this
consideration of comparativism comes last in the Seminar - after
an iterative exploration and practice of comparison over the last
two days.
5. Id. at 15.
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B. GERMAN AND EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
The tensions announced by Justice Richard are held in balance
not only by powers distributed between federations and their vari-
ous constituent parts, but by a balance of power among branches
of domestic governments. Judge D. Brooks Smith of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and formerly of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania and the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Pennsyl-
vania, stated early on in the Seminar that he finds the current
relationship of the judiciary to the legislature to be the most tense
in his more than sixteen years on a variety of benches.
Illustrative of Judge Smith's observation is perhaps the fact
that Congressman Pat Toomey opened this Seminar by stating
that United States' judges ought only to consult United States'
sources of law. United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia might agree with Toomey, but Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and Chief Justice William Rehnquist have used oppor-
tunities not only inside the framework of case opinions (ten opin-
ions in 2004, as Professor Brand has noted), but outside the court-
room as well to go on record to state otherwise. At a German-
American law symposium in 1989, Rehnquist said:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United
States exercising the power of judicial review had no
precedents to look to save their own, because our courts
alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new
constitutional courts were created after the Second World
War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, among other sources,
for developing their own law. But now that constitutional
law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time
that the United States courts begin looking to the deci-
sions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own de-
liberative process. The United States courts, and legal
scholarship in our country generally, have been some-
what laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions
of other countries. But I predict that with so many thriv-
Fall 2005
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ing constitutional courts in the world today.., that ap-
proach will be changed in the near future.6
Ten years later, at a conference at Georgetown Law School in
1999, Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated:
But now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so
many countries, I am simply repeating now what I've
said previously: it's time the U.S. courts began looking to
the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their
own deliberative process. U.S. courts and legal scholar-
ship in our country generally have been somewhat lag-
gard in relying on comparative law decisions of other
countries.
We had a judicial exchange program between Canada
and the United States about ten years ago, and one of the
things the justices of Canada's Supreme Court asked was,
'We cite your Constitution; why don't you cite ours?'
What I answered that time was that the Charter of
Rights and Freedom was only seven years old. Of course,
now their Charter of Rights and Freedom, adopted in
1982 is about seventeen years old, so it's less defensible
to say that we're not familiar with it.
As I predicted in the past, with so many thriving consti-
tutional courts in the world today, we'll see a change in
this approach in the U.S. courts .... '
Rehnquist concluded by stating that the 1999 conference where
he presented these remarks was a step in the direction of making
that change. One might expect that this Seminar would be an-
other such step.
And at Georgetown just three weeks before the Duquesne Semi-
nar, Justice O'Connor said that the Supreme Court is increasingly
6. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts: Comparative Remarks (1989), in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE - A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 412 (Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993), reprinted in VICKI C.
JACKSON AND MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 167 (New York: Foun-
dation Press 1999).
7. William Rehnquist, Introductory comments delivered at the conference "Compara-
tive Constitutional Law: Defining the Field" (held at Georgetown University Law Center on
September 17, 1999, in conjunction with the 1999 meeting of the American Association of
Comparative Law) reprinted DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ix (Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnet, eds., Praeger 2002).
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taking cases that demand a better understanding of foreign legal
systems. A recent example was the 2003-2004 term's terror cases
involving the United States' detention of foreign-born detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. "International law is no longer a spe-
cialty .... It is vital if judges are to faithfully discharge their du-
ties. . . . International law is a help in our search for a more
peaceful world," she said.'
Moreover, in the context of knowledge production, current Har-
vard Law School Dean Elena Kagan has launched a curriculum
review at Harvard to re-examine how law is taught. This is the
first such effort since the deanship of Christopher Columbus
Langdell, who first maintained that law is a science in United
States' legal education more than one hundred years ago. Kagan
has stated that she is confident that the review will turn up the
need for competencies that are different for today's world, includ-
ing an intensified focus on international and comparative law.9
But despite these assertions, and perhaps in reaction to them,
the United States' Senate put forth a resolution in 2004:
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United
States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any consti-
tution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy,
judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or inter-
national organization or agency, other than English constitutional
and common law.1"
In the balance, one might conclude that United States' courts
and academies of law find that the production of legal knowledge
is benefited from comparative law. If so, then we need to look to
the specifics of how the knowledge available to these institutions
is bettered. Professor Tettinger's paper offers some examples of
where we might find them.
As is the case with the current German Federal Council, the
Bundesrat, Judge Brooks Smith reminded us earlier that origi-
nally the United States Senate was to have been appointed by the
several states. Today, the vertical structure of federalism found in
8. Associated Press, O'Connor Extols Role of International Law, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/ 0/27/scotus.oconnor.ap/index.html, (last visited October 27, 2004).
Thanks to Mr. David Alexander for bringing Justice O'Connor's remarks to my attention.
9. Beth Potier, Big plans highlight Elena Kagan's 2L, HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE
(September 16, 2004) at 3.
10. Interpretation of the Constitution, S. 2323, 108th Cong. § 201(2004) (resubmitted
as S. 520 (2005) and H.R. 1070 (2005)) (the purpose of this resolution is to limit the juris-
diction of Federal courts in certain cases and promote federalism).
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Article 23 of the German Basic Law inserts state government di-
rectly into federal government. Professor Brand's comments on
Articles 23 and 24 of the German Basic Law explain and analyze
this point more fully. But the balances of federal power in the
German Basic Law would seem to create some discontent among
those who must understand, work, and live within it.
In the past year, federalism in Germany has become a topic of
discussion beyond the inner circle of jurists. In the opening ad-
dress to a conference at Ditchley Park, London, "Germany in a
New Century," the German Ambassador's Office in the United
Kingdom characterized the problem as follows:
Implementing the necessary reform policy often comes up
against the inflexibility of German federalism. All the
major projects of recent times (tax, health and labour
market reform, immigration law) have required the ap-
proval of the Bundesrat, the Second Chamber of the
German Parliament. Again and again it's been apparent
that the checks-and-balances system created after the
Second World War to prevent absolute power has today
become a brake on reform.
We therefore now need to modernise our federal system.
The ultimate aim is to make a clear assignment of deci-
sion-making at all levels in the federal system, in such a
way that responsibilities will be clearly related to the
power to raise revenue. And the scope for blocking deci-
sions must be limited. The review of our federal struc-
ture now being carried out by the Parliamentary Com-
mission on Federalism is therefore urgently necessary.
Apart from anything else, it's damaging for Germany to
be constantly in the middle of an ongoing election cam-
paign.
11
While many compromises were made in areas such as taxation
and education during the more than one year of discussions, in the
end, the Commission was unable to facilitate any change - the
effort ended with no changes to the German federal structure. 2
11. Address at Ditchley Park, London, "Germany in a New Century," (June 11, 2004)
(Introduction to the first plenary session), (transcript available at http://www.german-
embassy.org.uk/ gernany-in a_newcentury .html).
12. Deutsche Presse Agentur, Entsetzen ber Scheitern der Staatsreform:
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The call for clarity included in the call to re-design German feder-
alism is reminiscent of the mandate of the Laeken Declaration
whereby the shared sovereign power of the European Union with
its constituent member states was called to task for being less
than clear. By comparison, as Professor Gormley has pointed out
during this Seminar, the United States' electorate generally has
no idea what a federal state is, despite the fact, as Professor Ale-
jandro Garro stated, not only are there nearly three hundred mil-
lion Americans living in a federal state, but approximately forty
per cent of all persons worldwide.
Returning to the German Basic Law, I would like to go beyond
Articles 23 and 24, and revisit Article 25 for a moment. Therein it
states that "[t]he general rules of international law shall be an
integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the
laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of
the federal territory."13 This example of shared sovereignty, taken
from the German Basic Law, the constitutive law of the most re-
cently-created federation in this seminar, presents an example of
alternatives to competitive sovereignty. Furthermore, Germany's
integration of governments does not stop with the federalism in-
side its own borders between its Ldnder (states) and the Bund
(federation). Professor Tettinger's colleague at Cologne, Professor
Stephan Hobe, has used Article 25 of the German Basic law as the
springboard for his idea of an "open constitution."14 As with all
members of the European Union, part of the sovereignty of the
German nation-state is volunteered to the Union. During the
drafting of the recent Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe, comparative practices abounded. In fact, rumor was that
the Chair of the Intergovernmental Conference (known colloqui-
ally as the "European Constitutional Convention"), former French
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, carried with him the biogra-
phy of United States' Constitutional Convention delegate John
Adams. Other continual references to the United States' Phila-
delphia Convention were daily throughout the 2003 conference, as
well as the negotiations that ultimately produced a signed Treaty
in Dublin in June of 2004.
Foderalismus-Kommission gibt auf [Appalled By Failure of the Country Reform:Federalism-
Commission Gives Up], Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger, Nr. 296, December 18-19 2004, at 1.
13. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 25. (F.R.G.).
14. Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 655 (2002).
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On a related note, at the Duquesne Seminar, Professor Keith S.
Rosenn noted that in preparation for the 1891 constitution in Bra-
zil, a Brazilian delegation was sent to observe the United States
Supreme Court. Even before the constitutional treaty considera-
tions of the European Union, the Union functioned both to repre-
sent states and individuals, much like the United States Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively. In her comments on
the presentation of Justice Richard, Professor Moira Phillips of
Osgood Hall made the point that with transparency and commu-
nication being far more fluid today than ever before, it may be less
necessary to administer government locally.
In recognition of the abilities of the communication media of
which Professor Phillips spoke, the European Union was man-
dated by the Laeken Declaration to incorporate not only more
transparency in European government, but to provide transpar-
ency regarding the deliberations during the Intergovernmental
Conference. These steps toward an open constitutional structure
that functions transparently to extend federalism cooperatively
beyond national borders may find traction outside the European
Union as well. The new African Union has made clear that while
the work of the old African Union was to rid African nations of
imperialism and colonialism, the new Union is looking toward the
European Union as a model for economic and governmental re-
structuring.
C. CONCLUSIONS
This Seminar has been entitled Federalism in the Americas...
and Beyond. I would like to conclude with a few remarks about
the significance of having added the word "beyond." Scholarly pa-
pers in the natural sciences often end with statements such as
"more research is necessary." Social critics might jump on such
statements as being too obviously self-serving in their efforts to
obtain further funding. If one is in the habit of attempting to de-
termine the meaning of texts by exploring the psychology of the
authors and constructing their "intent," then that sort of social
critique on such apparently self-serving statements may indeed
undermine the entire text. But there are valid alternative ways of
reading and interpreting texts.
In his contribution, Judge Brooks Smith explicitly declined to
use that sort of psycho-analyzing of the writer. In the production
of knowledge, leaving that critique behind is a way of analyzing
forward, rather than backward. But to say what "federalism"
Vol. 44
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means is also to note how it contributes to the production of
knowledge - for science to pursue its goals, it must act in the pre-
sent with a view forward, not backward. Federalism is a govern-
mental concept that concerns itself with balance - but it is not
necessarily competitive. It involves juggling two powers in the air
at the same time, as Professor Gormley metaphorically described
it. He also noted that when federalism works, it is voluntary.
That point is historically proven not only in the experiences of
the general sharing of legal power but also in specific areas of the
law, as with the co-operative federalism used in the United States
in the area of environmental law, generally, and mining law, in
particular. 5 Additionally from the sub-discipline of environmental
law, an area in which I have both practiced and researched, one
can find a model for federalism that is not necessarily competitive
in the principle "think globally; act locally."
Canadian media theorist and literary critic Marshall McLuhan
felt people subscribed to a "rear-view mirror" understanding of
their environment, a mode of thinking in which they did not fore-
see the arrival of a new social milieu until it was already in place.
Instead of "looking ahead," society tends to cling to the past. We
are "always one step behind in our view of the world," and we do
not recognize the technology which is responsible for the shift.16
By "technology," I would suggest that McLuhan was not limiting
his critique to material gadgetry, but was critiquing our social and
linguistic tools as well.
Justice Richard asserted that whatever its merits, comparativ-
ism cannot have as its goal the establishment of a hierarchy. Dr.
Antonio Lordi offers a theoretical alternative to the comparative
study of law (in particular, contract law) that he calls "comple-
mentary" rather than comparative." Federalist states are, of
course, not the panacea to all governmental structural woes. In
Professor Tettinger's contribution, we have seen that both the
European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany have taken
formal steps to clarify and simplify the public law relationship of
the whole to its parts. Yet we must remain open to the possibility
to the failures of federalism. As Professor Garro reminded us,
15. John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania's Implementation of Pennsylvania's Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How "Cooperative Federalism" Can
Make State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH J. L. REFORM 903 (1986).
16. http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/htmlM/mcluhanmars/mcluhanmars.htm.
17. Antonio Lordi, Toward a Common Methodology in Contract Law, 22 J. L. & COM. 1
(Fall 2002).
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"[F]ederalism in Argentina has been more of [a] failure than a
success." A forward-looking federalism is co-operative, not com-
petitive. It shares sovereignty through proportionality and sub-
sidiarity, and it voluntarily relinquishes power. We have had real
examples of both in this Seminar.
